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Summary: Serbia is considered as "an unfinished state" with a rather "undefined nation” 
and as such approaching the European Union. This raises the question to what extent 
these circumstances will influence the success of Serbia’s EU-integration process, since 
nation identity and statehood are in this article seen as constitutional parts of the concept 
of Europeanness. Thus this paper focuses on Europeanness and the identity behind it. It 
further gives an overview of the Serbian identity, first by presenting its dichotomy and 
then by highlighting the main factors, which have primarily shaped the identity of Ser-
bia. Finally this paper shows why a clearly defined national identity would facilitate Ser-
bia’s access to the EU. 
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After October 2000 and the fall of Slobodan Milošević's regime the new democ-
ratic Serbian government has proclaimed the access to the European Union as 
one of its highest priorities. The road to Brussels, however, has many tracks and 
a clear political commitment of the Serbian government and elites towards the 
EU, structural changes and reforms are among the main preconditions in order to 
find the fastest one. But, since the European Union is not just an institutional 
organization, but also a community of values, it remains a question whether his-
torically established norms and values in Serbia can potentially be in conflict 
with direct and indirect expectations, demands and values of the EU, and conse-
quently make Serbia take the longer path to the EU. 
This paper raises the question whether the Serbian identity stands in op-
position to the concept of Europeanness.
1 Considering the complexity of terms 
such as identity and Europeanness, in a first step the term of (European) identity 
and the concept of Europeanness will be briefly discusses. In a second step I will 
focus on the problems of the construction of a Serbian identity and the roots of 
these problems. Thereby it will be asked what historical circumstances, devel-
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opments and actors have primarily shaped it. In the last part this paper will com-
pare the Serbian identity with Europeanness. 
 
 
1. European Identity or the Concept of Europeanness 
 
One seems clear: there are not many non-ideological terms within the social sci-
ences, which are as vague as identity. The high number of approaches, defini-
tions and theories related to this term reflex its complexity and ambiguity.
2 
Theories focusing on a macro-level understand identity as a conditio sine qua 
non for social order and stability in every kind of community, while on a micro-
level identity is supposed to provide an answer to the question who or what we 
are. 
Identity. A common identity is usually seen as one of the most impor-
tant preconditions for the progress of one group of people, consequently of a 
society and a state. This kind of understanding is linked with the assumption that 
the economical, political and social-cultural diversity and complexity of modern 
societies and states can be overcome by referring to common values, norms and 
behavior patterns. In this regard identity is seen as a regulator of social order, 
which enables individuals to act individually despite their belonging to a collec-
tive. Identity in this sense provides of course only a theoretical, moreover an 
abstract frame, since it is no institution able to regulate. In practice, more is nec-
essary to provide social order, above all the establishment of a (national) state, 
which is the needed institution and which represents an identification focal point 
that guarantees the “identity of identity and difference”.
3 As such the national 
state promotes an objective “people’s spirit” which connects practices and indi-
viduals on the base of their common “national livery”.
4 A national state and 
identity hence determine each other: collective identity gets its full affirmation 
and confirmation, within a national state that is defined by territory, borders and 
a nation/society, and vice versa: without common values and norms, without a 
common identity of its nation and solidarity build upon it, the national state 
would not be more than a scaffold. Within this interaction identification with the 
national state and the values that are represented by it seems unavoidable for the 
individual.
5 
Nassehi sees both the nation and the national identity as two major in-
ventions of Europe’s modernity. The individual is forced to identify himself with 
the nation, or at least to build his identity upon the national identity, which is 
closely related to a homogeneous national state. In regard to this, European 
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4 Ibid. 
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thinking is seen as thinking in terms of national identity and the model of na-
tional states only.
6 This has resulted in a Europe consisting of national states, 
which consequently led to discrimination, expulsions, prosecutions of minorities, 
further to border-wars and forced assimilation, which are in South East Europe 
upon today not yet completely overcome.
7 
Identity is hence much more than a subjective or objective attitude. 
Moreover, an established national identity is – at least within the European dis-
course - a conditional factor of state and nation building and thus an indirect 
“soft” precondition for the EU-membership, as a community of predominant 
nation states.
8 Looking on national identity within this context, many countries 
in Eastern and Southern Europe expressed that “the road to Europe is the road of 
national liberation“, which used to be one popular slogan in Estonia after 1989.
9 
This of course means, that getting an identity compatible with the EU means 
establishing a typical national state which one major pillar is national identity. 
The Concept of Europeanness. Given that the single national identities 
of the national states – members of the EU – are crucial for the existing or yet 
undergoing creation of Europeanness,  we should have a look on specific charac-
teristics and/or values of these states and societies.  
Defining, selecting and appraising specific characteristics, which are 
European, depend of course on one’s perspective. Some powerful parts of the 
British elites, for example, see “European values” with constraints, since for 
them the states on the other side of the Channel are “the undisciplined other”.
10 
At the same time English writers see the Balkans forever condemned to stay 
“Europe that yet has to become Europe” or to be “what Europe has once been”
11, 
expressing at the same time a part of their definition of “Europeanness”. Re-
becca West, on the other side, stated in her book Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, 
that while, German bombs were falling on London, she has discovered the truly 
and essential Europeanness of the Balkans.
12 In Serbia today being “European” 
mostly means being modern, and if something is „European”, it has a high qual-
ity or it is “well done”.
13 In Serbian radical conservative circles however, “Euro-
pean” has a pejorative connotation, meaning soft, decadent or hypocritical.
14  
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These different understandings of “European” are, of course, nothing 
unusual, since they only mirror the different specific perspectives on what is 
seen as “European”. However, it might be possible to derive universal values, 
upon which the EU has been built until today. These values are above all re-
flected in a self-consciousness of every national state within the EU, and in the 
simultaneous existence of a consciousness of common tradition and culture.
15 
The importance of the national state and the identification of citizens with their 
national state, and further with a region they border with, and finally with 
Europe can be seen as crucial European values, from which we can derive the 
principles of self-determination, voluntariness, religious tolerance, openness, 
political pluralism and federalism, free trade and a awareness of a common iden-
tity based on shared values and cutting across different cultures.
16 
This consequently means that European values are not linked to a spe-
cific ethnic, linguistic, socio-cultural, institutional, historical or geographical 
mutuality, but to abstract values, which exist despite all these, mentioned deter-
minations, which are different in every state. This also means that these Euro-
pean values are to some extent post national. The national state hence is seen as 
a precondition for a postnational acting and a commitment to Europe. In this re-
gard Sylke Nissen sees two dimensions of being European: the affective dimen-
sion, which stands for an emotional solidarity with Europe, and an utilitarian 
dimension, which mirror a cost-benefit calculation of national states within the 
EU
17, and which eventually is supportive for the idea of Europe for purely na-
tional interests. Hence there is an awareness that if national states within the EU 
are based upon solidarity they will all become stronger and thus strengthen the 
EU and vice versa. 
 
2. Serbian Identity 
 
Identity seen on a macro-level, as it has been described in the previous passage, 
stands for an objective frame necessary for the establishment of a nation state. 
Hence the missing of this frame in Serbia is seen as one of the main reason why 
Serbia is considered as an unfinished state. In order to try to offer a possible ex-
planation why Serbia has a yet not defined national identity, first an external and 
internal perception of the Serbian national identity will be given, followed by the 
roots of such perceptions. 
“The Barbarous Balkans“ – Foreign perceptions of Serbian Iden-
tity. National identities are often determined not only from inside, but also from 
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stitutional frames such as the parliamentary democracy, separation of power, separation of church 
and state, market economy etc. 
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outside. External observers construct images, which are based on their experi-
ences and perceptions. Within the discourse theory this is also know as “mental 
mapping”. In the case of Serbia, and in a wider sense of the Balkans, Marija To-
dorova has dealt with this phenomenon in her book “Imagining the Balkans”.
18 
She focused primarily on the image of the Balkans that has been created during 
the last decade of the 20
th century within the Western world. In doing so To-
dorova deplored the notedly stereotypicalization of the Balkans and its reduction 
to elements of primordial societies. She found that these images represent an 
(un)intentional construction made by western decision-makers, which has very 
little in common with the self-perception of the people living on the Balkans. 
Nevertheless, this construct of a „Balkan identity“ in the media and public space 
was dominant and had doubtlessly a certain influence on the self-perception of 
the people living on the Balkans.  
Another author analyses foreign constructions of the Balkans based 
upon other sources. In her book “Inventing Ruritania. The Imperialism of the 
Imagination“
19 Vesna Goldsworthy is dealing with perceptions of the Balkans, 
its culture and its inhabitants, based upon Anglo-American literature and news-
papers from the 19
th century. In doing so she shows that English literature in that 
time played a significant role in the creation of stereotypes related to the “wild 
Balkan”. In regard to that Goldsworthy introduces the new theoretical term “Im-
perialism of Imagination“, describing a cultural colonization of a region. The 
people of the Balkans, mainly the Serbs, are thereby pictured with a constructed 
image of a child, of whom it needs to be taken care of, but then often has to be 
given up. The fact that this image is even today still present Goldsworthy illus-
trates with a quote of an anonymous employee of the UN-mission in Kosovo 
who was cited by The Guardian: ”That is like dressing a child: you pass him the 
economic pants, the education shirt, the democratic jacket etc. The child how-
ever wants to run away all the time and to play in its underwear. If we let it go, it 
will harm itself.”
20 This picture of childishness of the people of the Bal-
kans/Serbs and of their wild character is the one Goldsworthy has found in the 
English literature from the 19th century.
21 Thereby the West gets the role of an 
adult and responsible parent of children, who would – without the supervision of 
parents – only fight.  
External observers hence, see Serbia and the Serbian identity as primor-
dial and not self-determined. These external perceptions go to some extent along 
with the internal perceptions. 
Internal Perceptions of Serbian Identity. Neutrally said, identity is 
build upon three essential interdependent elements: 1. birth, which creates ties to 
family, nation and to a concrete geographical space; 2. culture, which forms in-
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dividuals and groups spiritually and emotionally; 3. acceptance of common val-
ues which help creating communities of values. Hence identity can be deter-
mined on the basis of the following categories: place of living (town or district 
of town, country, continent etc), religion, family, profession, nation, age-class, 
ideology etc.
22 By taking only these categories in order to find the main identifi-
cation patterns (and hence the national identity) of the Serbian society, several 
studies have shown that people in Serbia identify themselves utmost with their 
own age group. The next common affiliation is with their place of living, and 
then to their nation. But based upon these results only, no national identity can 
be drawn, since for the most part national identity depends on values and ideolo-
gies. 
Defining national identity upon values and ideology leads in Serbia to two 
relatively opposite understandings of national identity and the values and norms 
each of them is based upon: 
1.  Serbia as a western European country, respectively a country that be-
longs to the western culture. This identity is closely linked to liberal val-
ues, it has a strong urban identification and does not see the nation in the 
foreground, but the citizen. 
2.  Serbia as a traditional state that geographically belongs to Europe but 
does not necessarily share all values considered as European. This iden-
tity is also related to an orientation towards Russia. It sets collectivism 
before individual responsibility and underlines the orthodox/Slavic heri-
tage. It further has a rather distance attitude towards the West and liberal 
values, and finds its primarily identification in the Serbian nation. 
 
This strong dichotomy of identities, which as such in one or another way exist in 
every individual and society, is for Serbia insofar problematic, as it does not 
leave room for even a minimal comprehensive identity. Consequently, these two 
(national) identities exist in parallel and hinder the establishment and definition 
of a common Serbian national identity, which is needed in order to support a 
national state and its progress.
23 Hence there is not one consistent, but two dis-
contiguous national identities in Serbia. As a consequence there are dichotomies 
throughout the whole society and its institutions.   
 
 
3. The Historical Origins of the Dichotomy within the Serbian National 
Identity 
 
Many historical circumstances have shaped today’s dichotomy within the Ser-
bian national identity. The development of the Serbian society was not only 
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over-directed for a long period, but was also marked by discontinuity. This pas-
sage will deal with some of the influences and try to interrelate them. 
The Ottoman Heritage. Under the Ottoman rule from the 15th to the 
19th century, Serbia disappeared as a state with own territories and own power 
stakeholders. With a non-existing state the survival of the Serbian nation was 
endangered as well. While the medieval Serbian state did have connections to 
Western Europe and the Western church, it has lost them during the period of the 
Ottoman rule, because at one side there was no Serbian state anymore, and on 
the other because the Ottoman power has set its own patterns of politics, econ-
omy and culture, which stood in opposition to the western patterns, and which 
hence, during the centuries of occupation, became dominant in Serbia. In order 
to resist the Turkish authority the nation in Serbia has developed a strong ethni-
cal homogeneity with strong solidarity and a high degree of isolation. And, since 
there was no institutional possibility to act on a national level, the people in Ser-
bia had to rely on their closest circle (family) which is one of the reasons why a 
national identity and consciousness could not be hold up over four centuries. 
Hence they built upon close ties within their families (distinctive clan struc-
tures), while partitioning themselves from all that is foreign. In correlation to 
this overproportional significance and approval of primary groups (family), there 
was a less significance, moreover a resisting attitude towards the state as such 
(state institutions, political organizations and the differentiation of people ac-
cording to their profession).
24 As a result, individuals in Serbia have developed 
values, which are not in favor of a state and/or of state institutions; they lived in 
closed circles and accepted the pater familias as the highest authority.
25 Hence 
during that time the nation or national identity was very ambivalent and lacking 
in self-confidence.
26 The only national institution that to some extent had an in-
fluence at that time was the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
   The Serbian Orthodox Church. The impact of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church on the dichotomy within the Serbian national identity cannot be over-
seen. During the century long occupation by the Ottoman Empire the church has 
been the only pillar of a somehow national identity and hence it has had a sig-
nificant influence as far as culture, customs and religious beliefs, which, accord-
ing to Max Weber, play a certain role when it comes to the creation of national 
identity.
27 This influence was smaller during the 20th century and the communist 
regime, but has again strongly increased at the end of the last century.  
In this regard it can be observed that the philosophy of the Serbian or-
thodox church does not support liberal values, it is further more in favor of col-
lectivism than individualism, and believes that an organic unity („symphony“) 
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between state, church and nation is the most suitable solution for progress. This 
of course does not accord with liberal aspects and hence it splits the Serbian na-
tion, since those who support the church and its ideology, can hardly support a 
Serbian national identity that is directed towards Western Europe values and the 
EU. 
The Influence of Great Powers and the Period After 1945. The di-
chotomy in Serbia’s national identity was partially shaped by international rela-
tions and the great powers as well. Although Serbia became independent in 
1878, it was in the years before and after exposed to different influences, mainly 
to those of Russia and the Habsburg Empire, which have by turns placed differ-
ent values. Their influence depended on the affiliation of the Serbian kings and 
ruling political elites, which have changed often, since the rulers have switched 
between East and West according to short-term interests, and due to the position 
of the young and undeveloped Serbian state, which had to seek for partners on 
both sides. That is an additional reason why until 1941 the Serbian identity was 
still marked by a dichotomy, which means that it was sometimes closer to the 
East, and sometimes to the West, but never clearly committed to one of it.  
Under the communist regime Yugoslavia and Serbia were first primarily 
orientated towards the Soviet Union, building upon the common anti-fascist 
movement and communist ideology. After Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948 
Yugoslavia turned again more towards the West, but still was not clearly com-
mitted to Western values and a capitalistic system.
28 After 1945 and until the 
Berlin wall was torn down, Yugoslavia, which was often described as “the coun-
try sitting on the fence”, tried to establish one national identity that would over-
come the dichotomy which was characteristic for the Serbian identity. This at-
tempt, however, has failed for many reasons and Yugoslavia and the communist 
regime fell apart in 1991, leaving or reestablishing the dichotomy within the 
Serbian national identity. 
The war in the former Yugoslavia led to a search for new and old identi-
ties within all its nations. During the last decade of the 20
th century Serbian po-
litical elites turned again to Russia and against the western countries, they intro-
duced traditional values again (“retraditionalism”),
29 rejected the liberal system 
and stuck to the ideology of collectivism, which was common during commu-
nism. Finally in 2000, as mentioned above, the new Serbian government has de-
clared its commitment to Western Europe again, but the period since then is too 
short in order to overcome the dichotomy. 
Concluding it can be said that for the period of more than a century Ser-
bia has apparently switched many times between two ideological system and 
values, and hence identities. Neither one struck roots, while the antagonism be-
tween these two identities did not decrease during the time. As a consequence 
                                                 
28 In order to underline its distance to the western states Tito was one of the founders of the Non-
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Serbia today still has no national identity build upon consensus and hence its 
chances to define a nation and a national state decrease as well, confirming the 
thesis that Serbia still is a “unfinished state of an belated nation”.
30 
 
 
4. Serbian Identity and the Concept of Europeanness – How Compatible 
Are They? 
 
This paper posted the question whether Serbian national identity is an obstacle 
for Serbia’s EU-accession process. It approached identity on a macro level and 
found that identity as such is a precondition for the state- and nation-building 
process, which was crucial for all European states within the current EU. It then 
briefly presented the Serbian identity on a micro level. In order to identify a na-
tional identity that is as close to reality as possible, we need objective percep-
tions of individuals from one state/nation, which are related to many variables, 
especially to values. In doing so for Serbia, it has been shown, that Serbia has a 
split identity. A strong dichotomy of the identity still disables Serbia to find an 
identificational common denominator through its nation in order to define one 
universal identity that would be carried and supported by the majority of the 
people. A closer look on the causes of this dichotomy showed that Serbia’s his-
tory was marked by discontinuity and a changing influence of great powers from 
East and West, and that it consequently disabled Serbia in defining its own iden-
tity. 
On the other side the short overview on the concept of Europeaness 
showed, that the unity of the EU is primarily based upon strong national states 
and self-consciousness nations, which are as such open and willing for mutual 
cooperation, partially because they have a solidarity for each other, and partially 
because a cooperation brings economic and other benefits for them. Nationalism 
as such is in this matter not at odds with Europeanness and European values, 
since it is not constricted to exclusive particular and local interest.
31  
This concluding means that Serbia will only then take the fastest track to 
EU if it overcomes the dichotomy within the Serbian nation and act as a unified 
state and nation open for cooperation. This also means that, once the national 
identity is defined and supported by a majority, the Serbian state will have a 
higher stability and hence provide a frame for the deeper determination of its 
identity. This identity of course has to be open for European values as well, 
which seems clear since joining the EU should not be possible without a clear 
commitment to Europe. On the other side, as long as Serbia has a divided na-
tional identity, and as long as it has no “identity of identity and difference” it 
will have difficulties in finding the shortest way to Brussels. 
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Srpski identitet i koncept evropejstva 
 
Rezime: Srbija se smatra “nedovršenom državom zakasnele nacije” i kao takva je na 
putu kao Evropskoj Uniji. Rad postavlja pitanje do koje mere će ove okolnosti uticati na 
uspeh evropskih intergracijskih procesa Srbije, pošto se nacionalni identitet i državnost u 
ovom članku smatraju konstitucionalnim delovima evropskog koncepta. Članak se bavi 
“evropejstvom” i identitetom koji se nalazi iza toga pojma. Članak osim toga daje prikaz 
srpskog identiteta, prvo predstavljajući njegovu dihotomiju, a zatim ukazujući na glavne 
činioce, koji su sprečili nastanak konsenzusa u pogledu na identitet. Konačno, rad poka-
zuje zašto bi jasno definisan nacionalni identitet olakšao integraciju Srbije u EU. 
 
Ključe reči: Identitet, Evropejstvo, Nacionalna država, Srpski identitet 
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